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ABSTRACT 
 
Using time-diary data from 27 countries, we demonstrate a negative relationship between real 
GDP per capita and the female-male difference in total work time—the sum of work for pay and 
work at home.  We also show that in rich non-Catholic countries on four continents men and 
women do the same amount of total work on average. Our survey results demonstrate that labor 
economists, macroeconomists, sociologists and the general public consistently believe that 
women perform more total work. The facts do not arise from gender differences in the price of 
time nor from differences in intra-family bargaining: Gender equality is not associated with 
marital status, and most of the variance in gender total work differences arises from within-couple 
differences. A theory of social norms could account for within-education group and within-region 
gender differences being smaller than inter-group differences. It is consistent with cross-national 
evidence from the World Values Surveys and various sets of microeconomic data.   
 
1 Introduction 
It is well-known that men engage in more market work—have higher participation rates and 
longer workweeks conditional on participation—than women.  What has not been thoroughly 
examined, and indeed has been almost ignored by economists, is the issue of gender differences 
in the total amount of work—the sum of work in the market and at home.  Despite the obvious 
importance of looking more closely at how people spend their non-work time, relatively little 
attention has been paid to describing its patterns and examining its determinants.  A few studies 
have considered how the price of time affects the distribution of non-work time (Kooreman and 
Kapteyn, 1987; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1990); Aguiar and Hurst (2007) have charted secular 
changes in the distribution of non-market time in the United States, and Freeman and Schettkat 
(2005) have examined possible trade-offs between market and non-market work in a few 
countries.  This line of inquiry has been limited by the relative paucity of available data sets.  
Until recently no country provided data on a continuing basis on how its citizens spend their time, 
and many have never provided such information.  This absence of data has begun to change, and 
that change is what enables us to examine gender differences in the allocation of total work time. 
The issue of gender differences in time use is important for a number of reasons. First, 
because the amount of work (and thus the utility from leisure) is one of the crucial arguing points 
in the “gender wars,” simply discovering new facts about it is important.  Second, the 
determinants of those facts will allow us to infer how patterns of work by gender change as 
economies develop, thus shedding light on a crucial question in economic development.  Third, 
by developing a new explanation for patterns of gender differences in the amount of total work, 
we may provide an impetus for using similar theories to examine other differences in the 
allocation of time.  Finally, the facts we adduce and the theory we present to explain them can 
impose restrictions on a variety of economic models. 
Our purposes here are to document in much greater detail a fact that has been essentially 
ignored by economists and that appears unknown to the public, and to offer and test some 
explanations for that fact. In the next section we describe what we mean by market and household 
work and examine the gender breakdown of work at home and in the market using time-diary 
data from 27 countries.  Whether the facts that we adduce in Section 2 are novel, and whether 
they are already widely known, are examined in Section 3.  In Section 4 we consider some 
possible explanations of our findings and indicate which ones seem inconsistent with the results.  
This leads in Section 5 to the development of a theory of gender differences in total work time 
based on social norms. Section 6 examines some additional cross-country and micro evidence that 
is consistent with that theory and difficult to rationalize otherwise. The end result is a variety of 
facts and a theory that is not inconsistent with them, the totality of which might be used to inform 
how we model behavior in a variety of areas of economics, as we indicate in Section 7. 
2 Gender Differences in Market and Home Work  
In order to examine gender differences in work we need to devise general rules that allow 
activities to be classified as work.  We follow standard practice and define market work as time 
spent for pay (or in unpaid household production for the market). We assume that people would 
not be working the marginal hour in the market if they were not paid, so that at the margin market 
work is not enjoyable (or at least is less enjoyable than any non-work activity at the margin).  In 
the economics literature market work has generally been treated as the complement of the 
aggregate of all activities outside the market—implicitly all uses of non-market time have been 
assumed to be aggregable.1 
 We count as household work those activities that satisfy the third-party rule (Reid, 1934) 
that substituting market goods and services for one’s own time is possible.  Such activities may 
be enjoyable (as may work in the market), even at the margin; but they still have the common 
characteristics that we could pay somebody to perform them for us and that we are not paid for 
performing them for ourselves.  We define total work as the sum of time spent in market work 
                                                 
1See Weiss (2009) for an excellent discussion of the development of philosophers’ and economists’ views 
on what constitutes work.  
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and household production.  Note that we do not and cannot examine gender differences in the 
consumption value of the average or marginal minute of market or household production; all we 
do here is estimate, and then try to explain, differences in the total amount of time spent in 
productive activities. 
              We exclude all other activities from the definition of total work.  Thus for our purposes it 
does not matter whether non-work time is used for sleeping, eating, religious activity, television-
viewing, exercise, etc.:  Our interest is in activities that might be defined as work and thus 
possibly be valued directly in the market. 
Throughout this initial empirical section we define the aggregates of activities as 
similarly as possible across the countries under study. Respondents in these studies are given a 
time-diary for one or more recent days and asked to account comprehensively for all time during 
that day by time of day. The respondent either works from a set of codes indicating specific 
activities, or the survey team codes the descriptions into a pre-determined set of categories.  
Wide-scale time-diary surveys have been conducted for nearly 70 years (Sorokin and Berger, 
1939). 
No matter how extensive a set of activity codes is, each survey will have a different way 
of categorizing and aggregating what might seem like the same activity to an observer.  Time 
diaries have the virtue of forcing respondents to report a time allocation that adds to 24 hours in a 
day. Also, unlike retrospective data about last year’s or even last week’s time spent working, 
while the time-diary information is necessarily based on recall, the recall period is only one day.  
The shorter recall period and the implicit time-budget constraint suggest that information on 
market work from time diaries is likely to be more reliable than the recall data on time use from 
standard household surveys; and, of course, time diaries provide information on non-market 
activities that is generally unavailable in labor-force surveys. 
The aggregates from Australia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
States, and Israel that we use represent our own calculations from micro data in these sets of time 
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diaries.  We appended our own aggregations based on published summaries of recent time-diary 
studies from other countries, including seven wealthy EU countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Norway) and three transition countries (Estonia, 
Hungary and Slovenia) from Aliaga and Winqvist (2003); from various published summaries 
describing the results of time-diary studies conducted since 1992 in Canada, Ireland, Japan and 
New Zealand, and a set of sub-Saharan countries, Benin, Madagascar, Mauritius and South Africa 
(from Blackden and Wooden, 2006), and from Mexico and Turkey.2    
The definitions of total work for each of the countries are shown in the Appendix. 
Obviously they are not identical across countries—but they are identical across gender within 
country.  We cannot prove the absence of a systematic bias in the aggregations of results in each 
diary toward counting as work activities those performed especially by one gender or the other; 
but for our cross-country results to be biased would require systematic errors that are the same in 
most countries’ methods of categorizing work activities. 
Among the 27 countries that we study, the unweighted average of total work among 
women is 446.4 minutes per day (standard error = 8.6), while among men it is 421.7 minutes (s.e. 
= 8.9).  Although these averages differ significantly from one another, if we restrict the sample to 
the 14 wealthy (2002 real GDP/capita above $15,000, from Heston et al, 2002 and 2006) non-
Catholic countries the averages are 440.1 (s.e. = 7.4) and 431.4 (s.e. = 7.5) respectively. The 
gender difference in total work is quite small and not significantly different from zero in the 
richer countries.  We will refer to this striking outcome henceforth as the iso-work phenomenon. 
Given the fixed length of the day, this finding implies that there also is gender equality in the total 
of non-work time consumed. 
The scatter diagram in Figure 1 compares men’s and women’s total work in the 27 
countries.  The steepest line shows what women’s total work would be if it were identical to 
                                                 
2While a few of the underlying micro data sets are available, most are not, thus necessitating our 
reliance on published sub-aggregates in constructing the aggregate of total work.  
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men’s.  We then estimated a regression relating the amount of total work among women to that 
among men.  To accommodate the observation that women’s total work always exceeds men’s in 
Catholic countries, we included an indicator for this religious background (equaling one in six 
countries). The regression results (coefficient estimates and standard errors) are: 
FemaleTotalWork = 134.05 + 0.73MaleTotalWork +17.72Catholic , N=27, RBar2 = 0.590 . 
                                 (51.54)  (0.12)                   (13.36)  
(The regression line through the non-Catholic points is the lower of the two parallel lines in 
Figure 1; the line fitting the points describing Catholic countries is the upper parallel line.) We 
can reject the hypotheses that the intercept is 0 and that the slope on MaleTotalWork is 1, as well 
as the joint hypothesis.3  Nonetheless, the slope of the relationship between total work by gender 
is not that much different from 1; and, as we showed, the averages for rich non-Catholic countries 
do not differ significantly statistically or economically. 
 To examine the role of economic development, Figure 2 shows a scatter of the difference 
in average minutes per day of female over male total work time and real GDP/capita, along with a 
line fitting these points.  The scatter and fit suggest either that economic development is highly 
positively correlated with gender equality of total work, or that today’s rich non-Catholic 
countries have always had a different culture along this dimension from today’s poor countries 
and from Catholic countries.  Furthermore, the relationship appears to be nonlinear, with gender 
equality being approached or even reached at a sufficiently high level of personal income. 
 Clearly, based on these results we cannot claim that this remarkable gender equality in 
total work holds at all times and places. Our results also show that it does not hold in middle- or 
lower-income countries; and Haddad et al (1995) suggest similar findings for other developing 
African economies, as do Goldschmidt-Clermont and Pagnossin-Aligisaks (1995) for Bulgaria in 
1988.  The evidence, however, does suggest strongly that iso-work characterizes average 
                                                 
3The statistic testing the joint hypothesis is F(2,24) = 8.18, p=.002.  
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household behavior and labor markets in rich countries generally and is positively associated with 
national differences in real incomes. 
3 Novelty and Knowledge 
The iso-work fact has been demonstrated by several sociologists.  Robinson and Godbey (1999) 
employ data from a UN report (Goldschmidt-Clermont and Pagnossin-Aligisakis, 1995) to show 
that this fact describes the average of (recall and time-diary) data from 14 countries from the 
1980s and early 1990s; and Gershuny (2000) shows that it roughly characterizes the two averages 
over a similar sample of data sets covering the 1960s through the mid-1990s. No study has 
demonstrated it using data sets that were as well harmonized as those that we used here, nor has 
one shown how closely it describes average outcomes in individual countries.  
The fact is thus not new in the sociology literature, although it appears not to have been 
studied in the economics literature.  The difficulty, however, is that it has been swamped by 
claims in widely circulated ethnographic studies (Hochschild, 1997, and earlier work) based on a 
few households that women’s total work significantly exceeds men’s.  Indeed, even sociologists 
who have demonstrated it (e.g., Mattingly and Bianchi, 2003, for the United States, and Bittman 
and Wajcman, 2000, for several countries), downplayed it to focus on showing that women’s 
work is more onerous than men’s, and why women’s leisure provides less pleasure.  
 With all this evidence demonstrating gender iso-work, one wonders whether the fact that 
we have demonstrated is well known among economists, other social scientists and the general 
public.  To examine this issue, we designed a survey that asked the following question:   
“We know that American men (ages 20-75) on average work more in the market 
than do American women.  But what is the difference between men's TOTAL 
WORK (in the market and on anything that you might view as work at home) 
and that of women? Without consulting any books, articles or raw data, PLEASE 
PUT AN X NEXT TO THE LINE BELOW THAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE 
CLOSEST APPROXIMATION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE 
US.”   
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Respondents were allowed nine possible responses, ranging from a 25 percent excess of female 
total work, to symmetry around equality, to a 25 percent excess of male total work. 
In August 2006 we emailed this survey to three groups:  1) 663 labor economists 
affiliated with a worldwide network of such researchers.  The web-based survey allowed us to 
distinguish respondents who had spent at least six months in the U.S. from those who had not;  2) 
255 elite macro and public finance economists, members of a mostly American network of such 
researchers; and 3) 210 faculty members and graduate students in a leading American sociology 
department.  The first and third groups received follow-up emails three weeks after the initial 
survey.  Also, early in September 2006 we asked the same question of 533 students in an 
introductory microeconomics class.  Using the information on location in the first group, we thus 
have five separate sets of responses.  The response rates varied, but there is no reason to believe 
that non-respondents were less well-informed about the facts than respondents. 
 The results of these surveys are shown in Table 1. The majority of respondents in each of 
the five groups believe that American women perform at least five percent more total work than 
men.  Assigning half the respondents who state that there is equality to this category, we 
convincingly reject the null hypothesis that the proportions stating that men work less or women 
work less are equal.  Indeed, even if we assign all those stating that there is equality to the “men 
work more” group, this null hypothesis is rejected in some of the samples.   
 Samples of sociologists, experts in labor economics, leading economists and the public 
believe that women work more in total than do men.  Indeed, the results from the freshmen (half 
of whom are women) look very similar to those from labor economists and, in turn, to those from 
macroeconomists, even though all three populations have substantially different fractions of 
women.  Perhaps the only consolation is that the distance between opinion and fact is less within 
the groups of economists than it is among the sociologists.  Despite our demonstration of gender 
equality of total work in most rich countries using current time-diary data, and despite 
demonstrations using time-diary and recall data of this general fact by several sociologists, all 
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groups considered here appear ignorant of the reality. It may be that most people are aware of the 
underlying differences and that our samples are unusual; and, as is always true with eliciting 
information about beliefs, perhaps the respondents to our surveys were thinking about something 
other than the sheer quantity of work—perhaps how onerous it is.  Nonetheless, this evidence 
suggests as strongly as survey evidence on subjective beliefs can that people believe women’s 
total work exceeds men’s in rich countries. 
4 What Fails to Explain the Facts? 
Assuming substitution effects dominate income effects, economic theory predicts that a rise in 
women’s relative wage (i.e. the gender wage gap) will lead to more work in the market by women 
relative to men. The impact of this increase on the relative amount of home work should be in the 
opposite direction, so that the effect of a change in the gender gap on the relative amounts of total 
work is ambiguous.  Unless, however, additional market work is offset one-for-one by reduced 
home work, a rise in the female relative wage should raise women’s relative total work. 
 To examine this possibility, we use Polachek and Xiang’s (2006) estimates of the gender 
wage gap.  In particular, for 19 of the 27 countries on which we have recent time-diary data they 
produced estimates of the difference between the logarithms of the medians of the distributions of 
males’ and females’ wages.  Using these data, in the first two columns in Table 2 we present 
least-squares estimates of equations describing female-male differences across countries in 
market and total work as a function of the gender pay gap. The results on market work are 
consistent with an upward-sloping relative supply curve of labor to the market.  The market work 
effect, however, dominates the household work effect, so that we find that the female-male gap in 
total work is also positively related to the female-male wage ratio. 
These findings are not affected by the inclusion of real GDP per capita, as the estimates 
in Columns (3) and (4) show, nor are they affected by adding the indicator for Catholic countries.   
That the GDP variable is only marginally statistically significant, whereas Figure 2 suggested a 
strong negative relationship with a diminishing slope, arises from the exclusion of many of the 
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poorer countries where wage data are unavailable.  Higher relative wages among women lead 
them to work relatively more in the market, less at home, and more in total.  Despite the quality 
of the estimates, the equation in Column (6) describes below half of the variance in the gender 
difference in total work across countries.  The difficulty is that in 14 of these 19 countries gender 
differences in total work are clustered within five percent of equality, while the gender wage gaps 
in these data range from 0.07 to 0.69.  Something, not equality in relative wages or differences in 
per-capita incomes, is causing the pervasive absence of gender differences in total work. 
Taking a different perspective on these results, one might follow the literature on 
household behavior (e.g., Lundberg and Pollak, 1996) and view the gender wage gap as 
indicating differences in power in the household, as it would be regardless of whether one views 
spouses’ behavior as described by a unitary or a collective model.  By this criterion, we should 
expect that where female-male relative pay is lower we will observe men working relatively less 
in total.4  The estimates in Table 2 imply the opposite result.  Where one might infer that men 
have more bargaining power, as measured by relative wages, their total work is in fact greater. 
A second possible explanation for some of these facts is that husbands and wives pay 
attention to each other’s labor and leisure, so that we observe gender equality at the means in rich 
countries because most adult men and women are married.  To examine this possibility in the 
aggregate, in Table 3 we present means of market work and home work by gender and marital 
status for the United States in 2003 and Germany in 2001/02, two of the few countries for which 
we have micro-data.  While the female-male gap in total work is higher among unmarried adults, 
                                                 
4Consider a large class of models in which spouses derive utility from consumption, which is 
public and joint to the couple, and separably from leisure, which is the time-budget complement of total 
work time. The couple must produce a fixed amount of public consumption at home using a constant 
returns production function of each household member’s time, without prejudice to the relative efficiency 
of the man or woman. Assume that the joint family decision is to maximize a weighted sum of utilities of 
the two household members. The solution to this two-stage problem is a labor supply rule which implies 
iso-work if and only if each utility weight equals the percentage deviation of the respective gender wage 
from its average. Thus the greater the excess of male over female wages, the lower men’s total work 
relative to women’s.   
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in the United States it varies across marital status within 5 percent of equality.  In Germany the 
gap is larger among unmarried adults, but still not huge. 
An explicit test of the notion that gender iso-work is generated by husbands and wives 
focusing on each other’s work effort as part of marriage can be conducted by examining inter-
household dispersion in the within-household gender total work gap.  Because only one person 
per household was sampled, this examination is not possible for the U.S. in 2003, so instead we 
use the much smaller 1985 U.S. Time Use Survey, which collected data on both spouses on a 
single day. For the 2001/02 German data this is easy, as diaries were collected from both spouses 
on three separate days, which we average for each spouse.  As another comparison we examine 
data from the 1992 Australian survey, which we summarized in Figure 1, averaged over the two 
days on which each spouse kept a diary. 
Figures 3a-3c show the frequency distributions of the differences within households 
between the average daily total work of wives and husbands in the U.S., Australia and Germany.  
While the distributions are symmetric around means of zero, the implied dispersion is large in 
each case.  Indeed, regressions within each country of the wife’s total work time on the husband’s 
explain only 9 percent of the variation in the U.S., 29 percent of the variation in Australia and 35 
percent in Germany.5 While wives work more in total when their husbands work more, within-
couple covariation describes only a small part of the variance in spouses’ total work time. We do 
find evidence of complementarity of spouses’ total work (and thus of leisure), but most of the 
dispersion in intra-household differences in total work remains.6 This evidence is inconsistent 
with the assertion that the iso-work phenomenon stems from the alignment of behavior within a 
couple. 
                                                 
5If we examine differences in daily total work, and in Germany two-day averages, the unexplained 
variances are higher than those discussed in the text; but the gain to aggregating over more days drops 
rapidly as the number of days aggregated is increased.   
6See Hamermesh (2002) for evidence of the importance of both the quantitative and timing aspects 
of complementarity of spouses’ market work. 
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5 Social Norms in the Theory of Total Work
What kind of mechanism could coordinate total time spent on market work and secondary activities
across males and females on average, regardless of whether they are married or unmarried? The
simplest coordination device that equalizes total work across agents is a social norm for leisure that
serves as focal point for the determination of total work. Peer pressure or a strong desire to conform
to a common social norm for time allocation mutes market incentives and weaken the impact of
individual tastes. As a result, time use becomes more similar across individuals.7 If the social norm
is strong enough to drive the agent to conform fully, we obtain the iso-work result we observe in the
data.8 Alternative explanations of the iso-work fact are, of course, possible; but all must involve, in
one way or another, an interplay between social factors and individual tastes. This interplay might
lead, of course, to multiple equilibria. We relegate multiplicity issues to the Appendix in order to
focus on iso-work.
5.1 Baseline model
Imagine that, in the absence of a social norm, consumers maximize the linear-quadratic utility func-
tion
C − (1/2ǫ)(1− L)2 (1)
subject to constraints
C = Ω+ wH, (2)
H + L = 1, (3)
where C and L denote consumption and leisure, w is the wage rate, Ω represents non-labor income,
the parameter ǫ > 0 is an (inverse) index of the marginal disutility of work, and without loss of
7For a survey of social norms and economic theory, see Elster (1989). Social norms have been studied, among others,
by Akerlof (1980), Jones (1984), Cole et al. (1992), Kandori (1992), Young (1996), Lindbeck (1997), and Lindbeck et al.
(1999).
8In this simple story, total conformity only occurs if the desire to conform is infinitely strong. The literature on
conformity (Bernheim, 1994) has sought ways to obtain identical behavior without assuming an infinite cost of deviation.
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generality the amount of available time is normalized to 1.9 Optimal leisure is then
L = 1− ǫw. (4)
We call this the agent’s intrinsic leisure optimum. It is determined by private incentives, prices and
budget constraints.
5.2 Linear-Quadratic Leisure Norm
Now suppose that there is a social norm that influences, but does not mandate, individual leisure. We
mean by this that agents can choose the extent to which they adhere to the norm, and that they balance
the marginal costs and benefits of deviating from it. The cost of deviating may stem from guilt (an
internal psychological process) or shame (an external peer pressure or a reputational mechanism).
The benefit of deviating results from the joy of following one’s own unbridled inclinations that in
general differ from the norm.
Formally, assume that there is a quadratic cost of deviating from the leisure norm L∗, and pa-
rameterize the strength of the social norm by the coefficient φ ≥ 0,10 so that the utility function
becomes
C − (1/2ǫ)(1− L)2 − (φ/2)(L− L∗)2. (5)
Optimal leisure is
L = α(1− ǫw) + (1− α)L∗ ≡ L(w), (6)
with the weight α, between 0 and 1, given by
α =
1
1 + φǫ.
(7)
Intuitively, the social norm pulls optimal leisure away from the intrinsic optimum 1−ǫw and towards
L∗. The coefficient α will be small, and optimal leisure will be close to the norm, if the social
norm is strong (φ large) or leisure is not too wage inelastic (ǫ large). Higher wages, holding α
9We impose the restriction ǫ > 0 to exclude backward-bending labor-supply curves. Here, and in what follows, we
assume that non-negativity constraints on consumption and leisure are satisfied. In particular, we assume that the wage is
always below 1/ǫ to avoid corner solutions at L = 0.
10The strength of the norm for an individual may depend on the number of people who have adopted it. We examine
this possibility below.
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constant, increase the distance between L and L∗ by making it more costly to deviate from the
intrinsic optimum.
Now suppose male (m) and female (f ) wages differ, but that there are no within-gender wage
differences, and therefore no within-gender leisure difference. Assume also, to simplify, that the
wage sensitivity of leisure (α) is the same for both sexes.11 As a result, the average (and individual)
leisure of agents of gender i is simply L¯i = L(wi), and aggregate leisure gap is
L¯m − L¯f = L(wm)− L(wf ) (8)
= −αǫ(wm − wf ). (9)
Since α is decreasing in φ, equation (8) implies iso-work—a leisure gap close to zero—if the norm
is very strong. In the limit, limφ→∞(Lm − Lf ) = 0. In words, a very strong norm mutes the effect
of differing male and female wages on leisure, thereby leading to iso-work by equalizing male and
female leisure in the aggregate.
This result highlights an essential ingredient of any norm-based explanation of the iso-work fact:
the fact that the fraction of men and women that share a given norm is identical. We call this feature
the gender-neutrality of norms, and we will show below that it is crucial for iso-work to emerge in the
presence of many norms and within-gender wage heterogeneity. In the current example, it is because
all males and all females have the same leisure norm that a larger φ eliminates the differences between
male and female leisure. Were the fraction of men and female who adopt the norm L∗ different, we
would, ceteris paribus, observe different male and female average leisure even when φ = +∞.
Hence the fact that total work is essentially invariant to gender in high-income countries (but less
so in poorer economies) suggests, if the social norm story is correct, that a fundamental change of
norms takes place in the process of economic development: gender-neutral, or gender-blind norms
replace gender-specific social reference.12
11This last assumption, which is of course at odds with estimates of labor supply elasticities for males and females, can
easily be relaxed.
12Note that no causal statement is being made here. One can easily write models in which gender-specific norms cause
economic backwardness, and models in which competition and development cause gender equality.
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5.3 Accounting for Within-Gender Heterogeneity
Although it provides us with an important insight, the small model we have just outlined is not suf-
ficient to rationalize all the facts. The empirical difficulty we face is that the iso-work fact coexists
with significant within-gender (and more generally within-group) heterogeneity of leisure. This is
inconsistent with the simple story told above, because as φ → +∞ the labor supply of each indi-
vidual, whether male or female, converges to the common, gender-neutral norm L∗ regardless of the
wage.13 As a result, while a strong norm bridges the gap between male and female leisure, it also
eliminates any within-gender heterogeneity of leisure.14 This unpleasant feature can be avoided by
allowing for non-gender based social clusters, or multiple social norms.
5.3.1 Social Clusters
Imagine that each gender can be stratified into social clusters that are defined by the relative position
in the wage distribution. Assume, for instance, that males and females above their gender’s median
wage share a common leisure norm, and that there exists another leisure norm for males and females
below the median wage. Note that we could just as well cluster agents according to the color of
their eyes, the month in which they are born, or the neighborhood in which they live. The crucial
assumption, as hinted above, is that the clusters are defined by gender-neutral characteristics: the
fractions of men and women above the median wage of their respective gender are identical, and so
are (presumably) the proportions of men and women who have blue eyes, are born in December, or
live in Austin, TX.15
Suppose, to be more formal, that there are two leisure norms L∗h and L∗l ,16 and that an individual,
male or female, adopts norm L∗h (resp., L∗l ) if he/she is in the upper q-th (resp. lower upper 1− q-th)
percentile of the respective gender’s wage distribution. Define the threshold wages wi by
1− F i(wi) = q, (10)
13This is also true if ǫ, the sensitivity of leisure to the wage, differs across sexes.
14Note that the theory of conformity developed by Bernheim (1994) to explain why people with different intrinsic
preferences behave identically suffers, from the perspective of iso-work, from the same weakness as the linear-quadratic
model with one norm φ =∞: it wipes out all within-group heterogeneity.
15By contrast, social leisure norms defined in terms of position of the wage above or below some arbitrary levels (i.e., a
leisure norm for “high” wage males and females, another one for “low” wage ones) will be in general gender-biased, as the
proportions of males and females adopting a given norm will differ unless the separating levels happen to coincide with
median wages.
16The analysis can be generalized readily to many norms.
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where F i(·), i = m, f , is the cumulative distribution of wages for gender i. Thus, men with wages
above (below) wm and women with wages above (below) wf adopt norm L∗h (L∗l ). Assume that the
strength φ of the social norm is the same for all individuals. Leisure of an agent of wage type j with
wage w is simply, as before,
Lj(w) = α(1− ǫw) + (1− α)L
∗
j , (11)
so that the average leisure of agents of gender i and wage w is
L¯i =
∫
w<wi
Ll(w) dF
i(w) +
∫
w>wi
Lh(w) dF
i(w) (12)
= α(1− ǫw¯i) + (1− α)[(1− q)L∗l + qL
∗
h]. (13)
We immediately conclude that the average leisure gap between men and women is
L¯m − L¯f = −αǫ(w¯m − w¯f ). (14)
This is the same formula we obtained with a single social norm. As before, the leisure gap goes to
zero and the iso-work fact holds asymptotically when the social norm becomes infinitely compelling
(φ → ∞, so that α → 0). However, the existence of many social clusters (delineated by categories
that are orthogonal to gender) ensures that within-gender heterogeneity of leisure does not shrink
to zero as φ becomes large. Indeed, this orthogonality condition is necessary for the existence of
iso-work within any particular sub-group of the population.
5.3.2 Even More Heterogeneity
In Section 4 we demonstrated significant heterogeneity of total work, even within couples. One way
to capture this aspect of the data is to define higher dimensions of clustering based on other charac-
teristics of agents, and to repeat the foregoing reasoning for this finer partitioning of the population.
By doing so—provided of course the resulting categories are uncorrelated with sex—we could again
replicate the iso-work fact yet generate as much within-gender heterogeneity as desired by making
each social norm increasingly compelling. Of course, we would still find that within-category het-
erogeneity would go to zero, but this would not be much of a problem anymore as the categories
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would be arbitrarily fine.
Alternatively, within-category heterogeneity as norms become more binding may reflect idiosyn-
cratic heterogeneity in the population. This heterogeneity could stem from different tastes, or from
a noisy individual observation of the societal leisure norm.17 To illustrate how this line of reasoning
would play out in our setup, return to the first of our models with one norm L∗ for all, identical
wages for all members of a given sex, and a different wage for male and female workers. Imagine
that individual k observes the norm with some measurement error λk, believing that the desirable
norm is L∗ + λk instead of L∗.18 As a result, optimal leisure for that individual becomes
Lk = α(1− ǫw) + (1− α)(L
∗ + λk), (15)
with α defined exactly as above. Hence Lk → L∗ + λk as φ → ∞ (and α → 0) regardless of the
wage, i.e. regardless of whether one is male or female. Now suppose further that measurement errors
are idiosyncratic in the sense that the λ’s average to zero for each sex.19 Then it is straightforward to
show the leisure gap is zero, and the iso-work fact holds exactly when φ → ∞—in spite of the fact
that each agent ends up taking a different amount of leisure due to an idiosyncratic perception of the
norm.
5.4 Accounting for Variations in Total Work
The data presented in Section 2 make it clear that, although total work is strikingly equal across men
and women, it does vary, sometimes substantially, across countries, region and over time. Since we
have attempted in the previous section to rationalize the iso-work fact by social norms by arguing
that they serve as a coordination device between male and female total work, we must also explain
how norms can vary. This is most simply done by endogenizing the leisure social norm.
Let us return yet again to our simplest model of social norms: men and women have the same
preferences, they face a gender-specific wage, there are no within-gender wage differences, and men
and women adopt a common leisure norm L∗. Remember that in that model average male and female
17As we do not wish to transform the quest for a theoretical explanation of the iso-work fact into a futile data-fitting
exercise, we prefer the second interpretation, which is potentially falsifiable, to the first, which increases the number of
unobservable parameters.
18For example, an individual of type k has utility function C − (1/2ǫ)(1− L)2 − (φ/2)[L− (L∗ + λk)]2.
19This leaves open the possibility that females and males perceive the social norm with different precision.
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leisure are given by
L¯m = α(1− ǫwm) + (1− α)L∗, (16)
L¯f = α(1− ǫwf ) + (1− α)L∗. (17)
Now close the model by assuming that that the gender-neutral normL∗ reflects average leisure across
males and females in society. Since there are equal proportions of men and women, in equilibrium
we have
L∗ =
1
2
(L¯m + L¯f ) = L∗. (18)
Combining the last three equations and solving for L∗, we conclude that the equilibrium social norm
for leisure is simply
L∗ = 1− ǫw¯, (19)
where
w¯ =
wm + wf
2
(20)
is the average wage in the overall (male and female) population. The equilibrium social norm is
independent of the strength of the norm, but it is negatively affected by the average wage rate w¯, with
a response coefficient that depends on the sensitivity ǫ of individual leisure to the wage. Whenever
these magnitudes change, across countries or over time, the social norm for leisure varies. There is
no reason to expect it to remain to be constant.
5.5 Accounting for the Relationship between GDP Per Capita and the Female-Male
Total Work Difference
We have argued above that female-male differences in total work are negatively related to GDP per
capita. A social norm theory of leisure can deliver this fact in at least three, not mutually exclusive
three ways. The first relies on the link between economic development and the increased gender-
neutrality of social reference groups. The second, which is slightly more ad hoc, assumes that the
cost of deviating from a social norm is positively related to the wage. A third approach, inspired by
Goldin (1995), postulates that women are socially stigmatized when they participate in some types
of market activities.
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First, a model of social clusters can account for the reduction in the female-male total work differ-
ence as GDP per capita grows provided economic growth is positively correlated with the adoption
of gender-neutral reference groups. Suppose for instance that at low income levels there are two
leisure reference groups: one for men, and one for women, each with a different (gender-specific)
leisure norm. This might be due to a taste for discrimination, for example, which is correlated with
income level. Then, trivially, iso-work does not hold at low income levels. If gender-defined social
clusters are replaced by gender-neutral reference groups as income rises (e.g., at quantiles of income
distributions), then development will be associated with a convergence of the total work difference
across genders to zero.
An alternative, possibly complementary explanation relaxes the assumption that deviating from
the norm entails a utility cost that is independent of the level of the individual’s wage. Let us consider
in the simple one-norm model what happens if people get are harassed when they deviate from the
norm. That is, imagine that, instead of suffering a direct utility loss as envisaged above, deviants lose
time fending off their critics, mending their reputation, or battling inner guilt feelings at the cost of
time available for work or leisure. Namely, they solve:
C − (1/2ǫ)(1− L)2 (21)
subject to constraints
C = Ω+ wH, (22)
L+H +
φ
2
(L− L∗)2 = 1. (23)
It is straightforward to show that the solution to this problem is formally equivalent to that of the
utility-loss model, with the parameter φ replaced by φw. In other words, the “harassment” model
is just the utility loss model with a cost of deviation proportional to the wage. Therefore, adapting
equation (6), we conclude that optimal leisure in this model is
L = α(w)(1− ǫw) + [1− α(w)]L∗, (24)
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with the weight α(w) given by 
   α = 1/[1+φεw] .           (25) 
At a low wage or level of development (w close to zero), the weight α(w) is close to 1, so that the 
intrinsic optimum 1 – w is the main determinant of leisure.  At a high wage or development level 
(w high), and given the parameter φ, the weight α(w) approaches zero, and the social norm 
becomes the sole determinant of optimal leisure.  As the value of time increases, so does the cost 
of deviating from the norm, resulting in a smaller deviation from the norm. 
 A final possibility is that, as in Goldin (1995), there is a social stigma attached to female 
participation in some market activities.  Goldin (1995) assumes that blue-collar, but not white-
collar work by a woman engenders a fixed utility loss S.  For our purpose, imagine a simpler 
scenario in which any female market activity is stigmatized, and in which there is no social norm 
beyond this stigma.  If a woman works in the market at wage w, her utility is, according to the 
baseline model of Sub-section 5.2, (Ω + εw2/2) – S, or the difference between the utility 
stemming from the intrinsic optimum described in (4) and the utility loss entailed by market 
participation that arises from the stigma.  By contrast, staying home to conform to the way 
women are stereotyped provides utility Ω.  Staying home is optimal as long as Ω  > (Ω + εw2/2) – 
S, or ε < [2S]/w2 . Development, and the concomitant rise in wages, thus reduces the impact of 
gender stereotypes on behavior.  In that respect, development makes men and women behave, 
ceteris paribus, in increasingly similar ways.20 
6 Some Evidence on the Role of Social Norms in Iso-Work 
The theory developed in the last section is not easy to test directly. It does, however, provide 
some guidelines for analyzing the data.  First, any test based on arbitrary sub-groups in which the 
                                                 
20An alternative justification for the correlation between the strength of social norms and GDP can 
be inferred from experimental work conducted in rural Africa (Ensminger, 2004).  One reason for the 
strength of this correlation may be that the physical demands of market work during the early stages of 
industrialization penalize women so that they must work more hours in order to supply the same amount of 
productive effort as men.  
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gender ratio differs (e.g., groupings by age, absolute earnings, etc.) is excluded by the theory.  
Second, conditioning on outcomes (e.g., examining differences by gender among paid workers) 
both violates the orthogonality condition and confounds effect with cause. We can, however, 
perform a number of indirect tests of the consistency of social norms with observed behavior.  
None of these can conclusively validate the theory to the exclusion of others; but each offers a 
chance to examine whether the theory can be shown to be inconsistent with a variety of facts 
gleaned from various data sets.  
If the notion of social cluster norms is correct, differences in total work across various 
candidate references groups will be large compared to gender differences within clusters.  
Consider first cutting the data by educational category.  In the 2003 U.S. data we divide the adult 
population into those with fewer than 12 years of school, 12 years of school, some college, and 
college or more.  In the German data we create four categories: Volksschule/Hauptschule (basic), 
Mittlere Reife/Realschule (high school), Fachoberschule/Fachabitur (vocationally qualified), and 
Abitur (university preparatory). 
Table 4 shows average minutes of total work by gender for each of the education 
categories in the U.S. and Germany.  In both countries, gender differences in total work within 
education categories are small, with the highest being the 5 percent excess of female over male 
total work among the least educated Americans.  Differences across categories in total work 
independent of gender are significantly larger:  In the United States the gap between the highest 
and lowest education categories in the average amount of total work is 39 percent, while in 
Germany it is 13 percent. Clearly, gender differences are tiny compared to those resulting from 
differences in educational attainment. 
Similarly, the data could be cut by region.  To the extent that there are inter-regional 
cultural differences, we might expect different norms regarding total work across regions, even 
though gender differences within regions are small.  The possibilities for examining this notion 
are limited by sample size in both data sets.  Also, confidentiality restrictions on the German data 
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prevent us from obtaining a finer geographic breakdown than West and East.  With these data 
limitations, we divide the U.S. sample into the South and non-South Census regions, and the 
German data into West and East. 
Averages of total work by gender within geographic area are shown in Table 5.  Notice 
first that within-region differences in total work by gender are not large.  While those in the South 
and within each German region are statistically significant, none exceeds 3 percent.  Among 
Southern women, total work is over 5 percent below that in the rest of the nation, while among 
Southern men it is 3 percent below.  For Germany we observe a qualitatively similar outcome:  
West-East differences in total work are 4 percent among women and 3 percent among men.  The 
contrast between inter-regional differences in average total work and within-region differences by 
gender is consistent with the notion of clustering on norms, although the differences are not as 
stark as those observed when we cut the data by educational attainment.  
An additional piece of evidence based on aggregated data asks, without any claims of 
causation, whether attitudes about gender roles are related to gender differences in total work.  To 
examine this relationship we use data collected in various years by the World Values Surveys 
(WVS).  Respondents in many countries were asked whether they agreed with the statement that 
men should have more right to scarce jobs than women. Taking averages of these data for each 
country for the most recent year before the time-diary survey, we present in Figure 4a a scatter 
diagram relating them to the female-male difference in total work for 21 of the 27 countries used 
in Figure 1 for which they are available. The scatter and the highly significant relationship 
between the gender total work difference and this attitudinal variable that we might interpret as 
representing beliefs in male pre-eminence suggest that, where the expressed norm about the labor 
market favors men, women perform a greater share of the total amount of work. 
One might argue that this diagram merely reflects generalized cultural differences rather 
than specific attitudes about gender work roles.  To examine this possibility we use a general 
measure of attitudes toward work in the WVS, the fraction of respondents agreeing that it would 
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be unfortunate if there were less emphasis on work in the future.  The scatter of this variable and 
the gender difference in total work is shown in Figure 4b, along with the regression relating the 
two.  The fit is much worse than with the variable measuring attitudes about gender work roles.  
Taking this line of argument one step further, we obtained an attitudinal measure from the WVS 
that reflects culture but is unrelated to attitudes about work—the fraction of respondents stating 
that they are very proud of their nationality.21  The scatter and regression of this variable and the 
gender difference in total work presented in Figure 4c show no relation between the two.22  While 
we do not claim causation from these measures of attitudes to behavioral outcomes, the exercise 
does suggest a link between those outcomes and specific attitudes about gender roles in work. 
Evidence on norms and their evolution in this context can be gleaned from the behavior 
of immigrants relative to that of their descendants (see Fernandez, 2007). To examine this 
possibility we first calculated total work time using diaries from the American Time Use Survey 
2003-2006, which contain over 6000 immigrants.  We were able to identify immigrants from 26 
countries for which the World Values Survey included responses to the three questions used in 
the analyses of Figures 4a-4c.  For immigrants from these 26 countries we then related the 
average total work of all married women in the immigrant group to the average total work of all 
men in the group and, crucially, sequentially to each of the three variables used in Figures 4a-4c.  
To account for possible differences in life-cycle patterns in labor-force participation we also 
controlled for the average ages of husbands and wives in each immigrant group. The regressions 
are weighted to account for the number of immigrant wives from each origin country who are 
included in the ATUS. 
                                                 
21All the data can be downloaded from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/.  The questions are: 1) 
“Do you agree or disagree with the following statement, When jobs are scarce, men should have more right 
to a job than women.” 2) “Please tell me, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a 
bad thing, or don’t you mind:  Less importance placed on work in our lives.”  3) “How proud are you to be 
[Nationality]?” 
22If we replace national averages of attitudes in each of these scatters with gender-specific national 
averages the results are hardly unchanged, as the correlations of averages of female and male attitudes in 
each case exceed 0.9. 
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The results of this estimation are shown in the first three columns of Table 6.  The crucial 
finding is in Column (1)—among immigrants from those countries where natives believe more 
strongly that men should have priority for scarce jobs women perform more total work than do 
men.  Both across countries and among immigrants to the U.S. the iso-work phenomenon is 
affected by attitudes toward gender roles in work.  The estimates presented in Columns (2) and 
(3) demonstrate that this result is specifically due to attitudes about the relation between gender 
and work:  When we examine the impacts of attitudes about work generally, or the effect of an 
unrelated cultural attitude, we find no impact on wives’ total work compared to husbands’. 
The ATUS data allow us to perform similar calculations for second-generation 
Americans.  We can identify such individuals from 25 origin countries, and the final three 
columns of Table 6 list estimates for them constructed exactly like those for immigrants.  There is 
absolutely no relationship between differences in any of these three attitudinal measures in their 
parents’ home countries and the female-male difference in total work.  The social norms about 
gender work roles that exist in other countries clearly disappear, at least at the national-origin 
level, after one generation in the U.S. 
We can go further toward examining the unique causative role of norms in generating 
gender differences in total work using the micro data on couples in Australia and Germany that 
underlie the histograms in Figures 3b and 3c.  For each couple (3080 in Germany, 1966 in 
Australia), we initially regress wife’s total work (averaged over three diary days in Germany, two 
in Australia) against husband’s, with the results shown in Columns (1) and (5) of Table 7.  
Following a now-substantial literature on the role of peer effects in behavior (see Borjas, 1992, 
for an early example), in Columns (2) and (6) we add to these regressions variables measuring the 
average work of wives in the particular wife’s education group (four in Germany; three in 
Australia), age group (<40, 40-54, 55+) and region (West and East in Germany; New South 
Wales, Victoria, Queensland and other jurisdictions in Australia).  Columns (3) and (7) present 
the same regressions with controls for the wife’s own demographic and family characteristics. In 
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both countries the addition of these peer outcomes improves the ability of the equations to 
describe the wife’s total work conditional on her husband’s.  Except for age for Germany in 
Column (3), peer outcomes of similarly-situated wives have significant impacts on the total work 
of individual wives.    
One might argue that these results merely indicate the importance of Manski’s (1995) 
reflection problem.  We cannot demonstrate causation conclusively, but indirect evidence 
suggests that our results do not arise solely from the reflection of one’s own behavior.  First, 
while we cannot construct finer education and region groups in these samples, we can 
disaggregate wives’ peer outcomes more finely by age—into seven age groups in the larger 
German sample and six in the Australian sample.  Re-estimating the equations in Columns (2), 
(3), (6) and (7) using this finer distinction on the age peer effects, the adjusted R2 increases in all 
cases, by about 0.004 for the estimates for Germany and by 0.001 in the estimates for Australia.  
This first test does not avoid the reflection problem and indeed might arguably exacerbate 
it. The problem is at least directly avoided if we randomly partition the German and Australian 
samples into halves, calculate peer averages for one half-sample and include them in regressions 
like those in Columns (3) and (6) based only on the other half-sample.  The results of re-
estimating the equations on the second half-samples differ little from those shown in the Table. 
These similar results cannot be based on reflections, as the half-samples are different.  Individuals 
in the half-samples may, however, be responding to their own unmeasured common 
characteristics rather than to the behavior of their peers.  There is no way of circumventing this 
potential difficulty completely, just as in the larger peer-effects literature extricating common 
effects from responses to peers’ outcomes is exceedingly difficult.  In the case of Germany, 
however, we can probe a bit further by including in the regressions describing wives in the 
2001/02 sample peer outcomes based on wives on whom time diaries were obtained in a nearly 
identical survey in 1991/92. Those results are presented in Column (4) of Table 7 and should be 
compared to the results in Column (2).  While the impact of wives’ peers’ education has been 
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vitiated when we include lagged values, the impacts of peer outcomes in the same age group and 
region, although attenuated, are still highly significant statistically.  
7 Conclusion: The Importance of the Iso-Work Phenomenon for 
Economic Modeling 
 
In Section 5 we showed that the iso-work fact and its link to economic development place tight 
constraints on the modeling of labor supply behavior by gender. Any nontrivial gender-neutral 
model of labor supply must rely on the existence of strong cluster norms which coordinate 
behavior, or rely on implausible mean-preserving transformations of underlying distributions 
which are in turn unlikely to be common across gender. Consequently, iso-work gives rise to a 
number of conundrums for economic models that rely on work-leisure choices to characterize 
economic behavior in both the short- and long-run.  
 The first implication is linked to long-run economic development. Our evidence 
documents a convergence of total work across gender with GDP per capita. We show in Section 5 
that this convergence can derive either from increasingly gender-blind assignment to reference 
clusters with strong norms, or from a convergence of gender wage-offer distributions to a 
common one. The past half century has also seen secular, albeit slow convergence in gender wage 
differentials. These two phenomena are probably related, but what is their source? Has technical 
change augmented female market production relative to that of men?  Is technical change in home 
production generally labor-saving (see Greenwood et al, 2005)?  More likely, how have 
interactions of these two types of innovation combined to generate the convergence in total work 
and the returns to market work?  Examining these interactions without considering gender roles 
(e.g., Ngai and Pissarides, 2008) is a useful step; but given the significant differences in gender 
roles in less developed countries, understanding growth and development will require accounting 
better for the convergence of total work and changes in the relative amounts of market and 
household work performed by men and women. This is especially true if one considers the 
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different roles played by physical and intellectual attributes over the agricultural, industrial and 
service-sector phases of economic development (Clark, 1940; Fourastié, 1949). 
Second, in household models we typically assume that a spouse’s bargaining power is a 
function of her/his market earnings.  Yet we have shown here, at least for most rich economies, 
that gender differences in the amounts of non-work time are tiny.  How can this be true if, as is 
still the case, men have substantially higher wage rates and market earnings?  Three logical 
possibilities present themselves. Men have more power, but are altruistic toward their spouses 
and toward women generally, and do not take advantage of it.23 Another possibility is that 
economists’ modeling of the household has been incorrect, and market earnings do not generate 
power in the household. A final alternative is that earnings do generate power, men are not 
altruistic, but the average man’s utility from his market and home work exceeds that of the 
average woman’s from the same total amount of work. In other words, iso-work may not imply 
iso-utility from the same amount of work. This last possibility would formalize ideas of the few 
sociologists who have confronted the iso-work phenomenon (e.g., Mattingly and Bianchi, 2003).  
Yet this possibility shifts the discussion to why women find their work more onerous than men 
find theirs, which, as it involves interpersonal utility comparisons, is not a question for 
economists. Why, e.g., is the marginal minute spent in an office dealing with recalcitrant 
colleagues and demanding supervisors more pleasurable than the marginal minute spent baking a 
cake or reading to a three-year-old? 
 Third, the choice between home and market work is generally determined by equating the 
marginal value product of household time to the real wage measured in terms of comparable 
market output (e.g., Gronau, 1980). To the extent that social norms constrain agents to a value of 
labor supply that ignores individuals’ productivity in household production, one or more 
                                                 
23Doepke and Tertilt (2008) present a model in which self-interest motivated by inter-generational 
concerns leads men to use their power to grant equal rights to women.  Bertocchi (2007) constructs a model 
in which concerns by a changing median voter lead to extensions of rights to women. 
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efficiency conditions in the standard model of household behavior might be violated, or needs to 
be modified. 
 Our results indicate the potential importance of going beyond standard neoclassical 
models to analyze social phenomena.  Iso-work does not prove the existence of social norms; but 
our inability to predict its patterns and correlates using neoclassical models and its consistency 
with the implications of social norms suggest that this is a fruitful general approach to the study 
of labor markets generally. It shows that an inductive, data-driven approach can be a useful guide 
to the development of theoretical discussions of the social determinants of economic relations. 
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Figure 1.  Scatter and Linear Regression of Female Total Work Against Male Total Work 
and Non-Catholic (Upper Parallel Line), Catholic (Lower Parallel Line), Equality of Total 
Work, 27 Countries* 
 
*The country abbreviations are listed in the Appendix.  
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Table 1.  Expert and Other Opinion about Men’s and Women’s Total Work, 
Percent Distributions and Statistical Tests 
 
Labor 
economists 
familiar 
with US 
Labor 
economists 
unfamiliar 
with US 
 Elite macro 
and public 
finance 
economists 
Sociology 
faculty 
and 
graduate 
students 
Economics 
principles 
students 
Men work:         
25% less  5.2 5.6 
  
        2.6 
 
20.0 
 
6.1 
15% less  18.8  20.4 
  
      23.7 
 
26.7 
 
18.9 
10% less  17.8 24.6 
  
18.4 
 
13.3 
 
18.7 
5% less  11.7 11.3  10.5 11.7 12.8 
Differ by less than 
2.5% 25.8 25.4 
  
 
34.2 
 
 
20.0 
 
 
23.1 
5% more  6.1 4.9 
  
3.9 
     
       1.7 
  
      9.2 
10% more  8.5 4.2 
  
5.3 
 
3.3 
    
      7.0 
15% more  5.2 2.1 
  
0 
 
3.3 
 
3.4 
25% more  0.9 1.4 
  
1.3 
 
0 
 
0.9 
N =  213 142 
       
76 
 
60 
 
445 
       
Fraction with  men < 
women 0.535 0.620 
  
0.553 
 
0.717 
 
0.564 
        
t-statistic on binomial 
if “equal” answers are 
split evenly 5.47 6.73 
  
 
4.08 
 
 
6.08 
 
 
8.98 
t-statistic on binomial 
if “equal” answers are 
assumed men > 
women 1.03 2.93 
  
 
 
0.92 
 
 
 
3.69 
 
 
 
2.72 
        
RESPONSE RATE 0.535   0.298 0.286 0.873 
       
Responses are to the question:  “We know that American men (ages 20-75) on average work more in the 
market than do American women.  But what is the difference between men's TOTAL WORK (in the 
market and on anything that you might view as work at home) and that of women? 
Without consulting any books, articles or raw data, PLEASE PUT AN X NEXT TO THE LINE BELOW 
THAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE CLOSEST APPROXIMATION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IN THE US.” 
 
 
Figure 2.  Difference between Female and Male Total Work Compared to Real GDP 
per Capita, 27 Countries 
 
DiffTotalWork = 68.16 – 2.39RealGDP/Capita; RBar2 = 0.394 
                      (0.56)      
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Table 2.  Impact of the Gender Pay Gap on the Gender Total Work (minutes per 
day), N = 19* 
 
 
Dep. Var.,    Female 
– Male Total Work: 
(1) 
 Market 
work 
(2) 
Total 
work 
(3)  
Market 
work 
(4) 
Total 
work 
(5)  
Market 
work 
(6) 
Total 
work 
Log (Female/Male 
Wage)** 
135.5 
 (73.02) 
44.0 
(38.54) 
182.8 
  (66.96) 
23.47 
(37.42) 
162.68 
 (71.71) 
55.00 
(32.34) 
Real GDP per capita 
($000)***    
4.38 
(1.78) 
-1.90 
(1.00) 
3.98 
(1.92) 
-1.20 
(0.87) 
Catholic    
  -17.22 
(26.07) 
33.78 
(11.76) 
Adj. R2 0.120 0.017 
 
0.321 
 
0.149 
 
0.293 
 
0.423 
*Standard errors in parentheses here and in Tables 6 and 7. 
**From Polachek and Xiang (2006). 
***From Heston et al (2006). 
Table 3. Time Allocations (minutes per representative day), Averages and Their Standard 
Errors, Women, Married and Unmarried Separately, U.S. 2003, Germany 2001/02* 
 
 U.S. 2003, 
Married 
U.S. 2003, 
Unmarried 
Germany, 
2001/02, Married 
Germany, 2001/02,  
Unmarried 
 F M F M F M F M 
Market 
work 
182 
(3.4) 
329 
(4.4) 
224 
(4.1) 
284 
(5.5) 
111 
(2.1) 
270 
(3.3) 
175 
(3.8) 
241 
(5.5) 
Home work 314 
(2.8) 
179 
(2.6) 
218 
(2.8) 
136 
(3.0) 
336 
(2.0) 
175 
(1.8) 
264 
(2.9) 
170 
(3.5) 
Female-
Male Total 
work 
  -12  22  2  28 
 
*Standard errors of means here and in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3a. Histogram of Wife-Husband Differences in Total Work, United States 
1985 
 
 
  
Figure 3b.Histogram of Wife-Husband Differences in Average Total Work per Day 
over Two Days, Australia 1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3c.  Histogram of Wife-Husband Differences in Average Total Work per Day 
over Three Days, Germany 2001/02 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Total Work by Education Level, U.S. 2003, Germany 2001/02  
 
  Highest 2nd 
 
3rd Lowest 
Gender  United States  
F 
518 
(4.33) 
474 
(4.4) 
455 
(4.5) 
386 
(7.6) 
M 
524 
(5.1) 
470 
(6.1) 
468 
(5.9) 
366 
(9.2) 
     
  Germany   
F 
172 
(2.8) 
152 
(6.5) 
147 
(2.9) 
98 
(3.0) 
M 
270 
(4.8) 
290 
(8.2) 
273 
(4.9) 
237 
(4.4) 
F 
475 
(3.6) 
465 
(6.2) 
456 
(2.8) 
406 
(3.3) 
M 
455 
(4.2) 
456 
(7.2) 
448 
(4.2) 
416 
(4.0) 
     
 
Table 5. Total Work by Region, Ages 20-74, U.S. 2003, Germany 2001/02  
 
Gender 
United 
States  
 Non-South South 
F 
480 
(3.0) 
457 
(4.2) 
M 
480 
(3.8) 
467 
(5.5) 
   
 Germany  
 West East 
 
F 
445 
(2.0) 
465 
(4.0) 
M 
436 
(2.5) 
451 
(5.2) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4a.  Gender Total Work Differences and Average Attitudes to Job Scarcity, 
21 Countries 
 
 
DiffTotalWork = -3.39 + 117.50AgreeJobsMen; RBar2  = 0.337 
               (35.16)       
 
 
 
 
Figure 4b.  Gender Total Work Differences and Average Attitudes to Value of 
Market Work, 21 Countries 
 
 
DiffTotalWork = 2.87 + 47.67LessWorkBad ; RBar2  = 0.078 
            (29.32)       
 Figure 4c.  Gender Total Work Differences and Average Pride in Nationality, 21 
Countries 
 
DiffTotalWork = 19.24 + 10.22VeryProudNationality; RBar2 = -0.046 
                            (29.11)       
Table 6.  The Effects of Home Country Social Norms on Immigrants and Second-
Generation Americans Total Work Time, 2003-2006 (Dep. Var. is Wife’s Total 
Work Time)a 
 
                           Immigrants       Second Generation   
 
            (1)          (2)         (3)             (4)         (5)         (6) 
       
Agree Men Should      105.84                -45.16     
  Have Job Priority      (48.87)                (131.24)      
 
Bad If Less Emphasis      -52.72               -36.20      
  On Work            (45.30)      (120.83)        
 
Very Proud of                21.12                -59.90 
    Nationality                (34.54)         (98.70)      
 
Total Work           -0.037       0.212     0.184           0.119      0.100     0.102 
  Husband           (0.251)    (0.248)   (0.252)              (0.223)   (0.218)   (0.218)      
 
RBar2            0.095        -0.040    - 0.088               -0.144     - 0.145    -0.130 
 
N =        26           25  
 
aAlso included in the regressions are the average ages of women and men in the group. 
Table 7.  Direct Tests for the Effects of Social Norms, Married Couples Germany 
2001/02, Australia 1992 (Dep. Var. is Wife’s Total Work Time)a 
 
                           Germany     Australia 
 
           (1)        (2)         (3)       (4)                        (5)       (6)        (7)  
       
Total Work        0.491    0.441    0.432    0.447        0.416   0.358    0.355 
  Husband      (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013)     (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)      
 
Average Total       
Work in Wife’s:     
Education Group         0.298    0.252  -0.404       0.466    0.587 
          (0.081)  (0.075) (0.231)         (0.111)  (0.129) 
 
Age Group          0.281     0.055   0.216           0.431    0.231 
          (0.046)  (0.065) (0.033)         (0.056)  (0.070) 
 
Region                  0.722     0.873   0.443           1.276    1.668 
          (0.159)  (0.161) (0.098)         (0.518)  (0.812) 
 
Norm Used        Current  Current  Lagged         Current  Current 
 
Wife’s Education,   Yes                Yes 
 Age 
 
Family’s Number   Yes                Yes 
 and Ages of 
 Children 
  
RBar2        0.353     0.372     0.377   0.368       0.292   0.325    0.336 
 
N=          3080          1966 
 
aIn Germany total work is the average over three days, in Australia it is the average over two days. For both 
countries the age groups are under 40, 40-54 and 55+.  There are four education groups in Germany, three 
in Australia.  Germany is divided into West and East, Australia in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland 
and other jurisdictions. 
DATA APPENDIX:  Definitions of Total Work in 27 Countries 
 
United States(US): Market work and work-related activities; travel related to work; all household 
activities; caring for and helping household members; consumer purchases; professional and 
personal care services; household services; government services; travel related to these. 
 
Australia(AUS):  Market work; cleaning and cooking; family and child care; shopping; and 
travel associated with each. 
 
Belgium(B), Denmark(DK), France(F), Finland(FI), Sweden(S), United Kingdom(UK), 
Estonia(ES), Hungary(H), Slovenia(SL) Norway(N):   Gainful work; study; household 
work + family care; proratio of travel time based on gainful work time. 
 
Benin(BEN), MadagascarMAD), Mauritius(MAU), South Africa(SA): Market work; 
domestic and care activities; commuting. 
 
Canada(CD):  “Total work” (paid work and related activities; unpaid work and related 
activities). 
 
Germany(G): Market work: employment and job search; home work activities; 
handicraft/gardening; care and sitting.  
 
Ireland(IE):  Care; employment and study; household work; proratio of travel time based on 
gainful work time. 
 
Israel(IL):  Market work; cooking and cleaning at home; child care. 
 
Italy(I):  market work; professional activities; training; domestic activities; family care; 
purchasing goods and services.  
 
Japan(J): Work, school work; house work, caring or nursing, child care, shopping. 
 
Mexico(MX):  Domestic work; care of children and other household members; market work. 
 
Netherlands(NL):   Occupational work and related travel; household work, do-it yourself, gardening, etc; 
childcare; shopping. 
 
New Zealand(NZ): Paid work; household work, care-giving for household members, purchasing 
goods or services, unpaid work for people outside the home. 
 
Spain(ES):  Market work; house work, child care, adult care. 
 
Turkey(TR):  Employment and job seeking; study; household and family care; proratio of travel 
time based on gainful work time. 
 
Appendix. Strategic complementarities: A Model of Stakhanov
In the text we have assumed that the cost of deviating does not depend on how many people conform.
Plausibly, the stigma attached to deviating from a social norm (or the very existence of a social
norm) depends on how widely accepted the norm is. For instance, the productivity norm established
by Alexei Stakhanov (1906-1977), the legendary Soviet coal miner who in 1935 extracted fourteen
times his quota, was compelling to individuals because his example was emulated, under the pressure
of Soviet propaganda, by a large number of workers.
This consideration opens the possibility of multiple equilibria through the existence of strategic
complementarities: if the loss that we experience when we deviate from the norm depends on how
widely the norm is followed, whether or not we choose to conform depends on our perception of
the prevalence of the norm among our fellow citizens. If we expect them to conform, we have an
incentive to act as they do, for the cost of deviating is then high. If we anticipate that others will
disregard the norm, however, the cost of deviating is small, and it is more likely that we will find
it optimal to follow our intrinsic optimum. The question then arises whether deviating is the stable
outcome that will emerge endogenously from a population of self-interested individuals. The answer,
as we establish now, depends crucially on the shape of the wage distribution.24
For simplicity, let us depart from the linear-quadratic model in the text, and assume instead that
the cost of deviating is fixed from the point of view of individuals. However, let us imagine that it
depends on the fraction π ∈ (0, 1) of “conformists” in the population:
ψ = π2/2. (26)
If no one in society conforms, there is no cost of deviating. The cost of deviating from the norm is
increasing in π, and thus maximal when everyone else conforms (π = 1).25 One can easily show that
an individual with wage w conforms if and only if
ψ =
1
2
π2 >
1
2
(w − w∗)2, (27)
24This Appendix is inspired by the work of Cartwright (2005) and Wooders et al. (2006) on the emergence of social
conformity.
25These two properties are crucial. The quadratic specification for ψ is adopted for simplicity but it is not innocuous,
as the number and stability of equilibria depend jointly, as we will see below, on the shape of the cost function and on the
distribution of wages.
that is, if and only if his/her wage is in the band [w∗ − π,w∗ + π]. The more widely adopted the
norm is, the wider is the conformity band, and the more likely it is that an individual with an arbitrary
wage will conform. Conversely, when fewer people conform, the narrower is the band, and the more
likely it is that an individual will deviate. This strategic complementarity opens the door to multiple
equilibria.
To illustrate this point, suppose male and females have the same cumulative wage distribution
F (w) over the interval [0, 1]. The fraction of the population with wages in the conformity band is
then F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π). Since this fraction must coincide with π in equilibrium, the fraction
of conformists in the population solves the equation
F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π) = π. (28)
Regardless of the exact shape of F (·), this equation always has at least two solutions, π = 0 and
π = 1. The former corresponds to a non-conformist equilibrium in which no one conforms, and a
conformist equilibrium in which everybody adheres to the norm.26
Which of these equilibria is stable depends on the shape of the cumulative distribution function
F (·). To illustrate this point, assume wages are distributed uniformly over [0, 1], so that F (z) = z
for 0 < z < 1, and F (z) = 1 for z > 1. In addition, assume for the moment that the norm is the
median value of intrinsic leisure, so that w∗ = 1/2 (i.e., the median of the individual w’s). Then
F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π) =


2π, for 0 ≤ π ≤ 1/2;
1, for 1/2 < π ≤ 1.
(29)
Figure A1 shows that for a uniform distribution of wages there are exactly two equilibria, π = 0
and π = 1. Crucially, only the conformist equilibrium is stable as F (w∗+π)−F (w∗−π) > π for all
π strictly between 0 and 1.27 Hence full conformity to L∗ = 1−w∗ = 1/2 will emerge endogenously
in this economy, and the iso-work fact will hold in its strictest form even though agents have different
wages and the cost of deviating from the norm is finite.
Remarkably, this reasoning holds regardless of the value of the norm. Suppose w∗ is different
26If π = 1, w∗ + π > 1 so that F (w∗ + π) = 1, while w∗ − π < 0 so that F (w∗ − π) = 0.
27The easiest way to see this is to observe that the difference equation F (w∗ + πt) − F (w∗ − πt) = πt+1 converges
to π = 1 as t→∞ for any 0 < π0 < 1.
π0
F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π)
1/2 1
1
Figure A1: Multiple equilibria (w∗ = 1/2; uniform distribution of wages over [0, 1])
from 1/2. Then, if we maintain the assumption that the distribution of male and female wages is
identical and uniform over the interval [0, 1], one can show that
F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π)
=


2π, for 0 ≤ π ≤ min(w∗, 1− w∗);
w∗ + π, for min(w∗, 1− w∗) < π ≤ max(w∗, 1− w∗);
1, for max(w∗, 1− w∗) < π ≤ 1.
(30)
As before, there are two equilibria, illustrated in Figure A2: a stable one in which everybody con-
forms, and an unstable one in which nobody conforms. Nothing pins down the norm: w∗, and
thus L∗, can take any value in the interval [0, 1]. Hence there is a continuum of equilibria with full
conformity over [0, 1], indexed by the social norm L∗.28
What can we say about the welfare properties of these conformist equilibria? Can they be Pareto-
ranked? To answer that question, we need only look at the welfare of an agent with wage w in the
conformist equilibrium indexed by w∗, and examine how it depends on w∗. We established earlier
that
UC = Ω+ ww∗ −
1
2
w∗2, (31)
28Note, however, that for other distributions (for instance, distributions with mass concentrated on extreme values), the
non-conformist equilibrium might emerge as the stable one. In addition, one can construct examples in which π = 0 and
π = 1 are not the only possible solutions, and in which the equilibrium fraction of conformists is strictly between zero and
one, and stable. We do not explore these refinements here, but they might help us explain why some groups or countries
experience less conformism than others.
π0
F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π)
min(w∗, 1− w∗) 1
1
max(w∗, 1− w∗)
Figure A2: Multiple equilibria (w∗ arbitrary; uniform distribution of wages over [0, 1])
so that
∂UC
∂w∗
= w − w∗. (32)
Since L∗ = 1− w∗, this implies that
∂UC
∂L∗
= w∗ − w. (33)
Hence low-wage agents (w∗ −w > 0) are better off in an economy in which social pressure dictates
high leisure. Conversely, high-wage individuals (w∗ − w < 0) are better off in a “stakhanovist”
society in which L∗ is high. This difference in welfare stems only, in our model, from the fact that
agents prefer norms that are congruent with their intrinsic tastes. Hence, the continuum of conformist
equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked.
